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Abstract
We estimate the impact of U.S. monetary policy on the cross-sectional distribution of state economic
activity for a 35-year panel. Our results indicate that the effects of policy have a signiﬁcant history
dependence, in that relatively slow growth regions contract more following contractionary monetary
shocks. Moreover, policy is asymmetric, in that expansionary shocks have less of a beneﬁcial impact
upon relatively slow growth areas. As a result, we conclude that monetary policy on average widens
the dispersion of growth rates among U.S. states, and those locations initially at the low end of the
cross-sectional distribution beneﬁt least from any given change in monetary policy.
JEL Categories: E32, E59, R10.
Keywords: Monetary policy, asymmetric effects, state dependence, regional business cycles.
Thanks to seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the 2004 NBER Summer Institute Workshop in Capital
Markets, and Wesleyan University for helpful comments.1 Introduction
Milton Friedman’s oft-quoted observation that monetary policy has “long and variable lags” implies a
more complicated propagation mechanism than is typically incorporated in aggregate linear macroeco-
nomicmodels. Mostcommonapproachestoquantifyingthemacroeconomiceffectsofchangesinmon-
etary policy ignore the possibility that these effects might be asymmetric, in that the economic impact
of contractionary policy might not be the mirror image of expansionary policy1 — or state dependent, in
that the transmission mechanism might differ depending on the stage of the business cycle. Put another
way, the consequences of a monetary policy shock might depend both on the sign of that shock and on
the history of other macroeconomic shocks that preceded it.
Identifyingthesetypesofnon-linearitiesisdifﬁcultinaggregatetimeseriesvariables: inagivensam-
ple, how does one distinguish similarly-sized policy shocks that have differential effects from differently-
sized shocks, if one must estimate the nature of both the shock and the subsequent dynamic effects?
Duetochangesinthepracticeofmonetarypolicyandthenatureoftheeconomy, evenalongtimeseries
may not be sufﬁcient to recover the true nature of the impulse and propagation mechanisms.
In the United States, monetary policy is determined at the national level in response to national
events. Yet it does not necessarily have uniform effects throughout the country.2 Recently, several au-
thors have documented differential effects of monetary policy on U.S. regions and states. Our work
complements that literature, suggesting that monetary policy can have important distributional con-
sequences. However, in our approach the main distinguishing characteristic is not a ﬁxed attribute of
the state or region, such as the industrial mix, but rather the relative position of economic activity within
the state prior to the policy change. By examining the effects on the cross-sectional distribution of state
activityofcommonmonetarypolicyactionsthroughtime, wecanbetterascertaintheextentandimport
of history dependence for the monetary transmission mechanism.
Any distributional consequences are likely to be of interest not only to U.S. politicians and policy
makers;suchaninvestigationalsomaybeinformativeforthedesignofinstitutionsintheEurozone. The
U.S.statescanbethoughtofassmallopeneconomieswiththeirexchangeratesﬁxedthroughacurrency
1Such asymmetry is implicit in another oft-repeated quip: “monetary policy cannot push on a string.”
2Although policy could be a function of regional data instead of, or in addition to, national aggregates, rarely is U.S. Federal
Reserve policy conceptualized in such a manner. Indeed, Frantantoni and Schuh (2003) make note of a video game in the
visitors’ lobby at the Board of Governors called “You Are the Chairman.” In that simulation the suggested monetary policy
response to a rise in unemployment in only one region of the country (several farm-belt states) is “no change.” (See endnote 7
of Frantantoni and Schuh, 2003.)
1unionthateliminatesmonetaryindependence. Whiletherearesomeimportantdifferencesbetweenthe
U.S. states and members of EMU — ﬁscal federalism, factor mobility, etc. — the broad similarities may
allow useful inference from the U.S. states’ experiences for current and future participants in EMU.
Our empirical estimates on a panel of U.S. state-level data suggest a resoundingly afﬁrmative answer
to the question proposed by the title of this paper: monetary policy is less beneﬁcial for areas that are
depressed relative to the average position of states at the time of the policy shock. Moreover, we ﬁnd that
the strength of this effect may differ depending on whether policy is expansionary or contractionary,
thus introducing an additional asymmetry into the transmission of monetary policy.
Finally, while the regional consequences are interesting and important in their own right, we view
the implications for the modeling of monetary policy more generally to be particularly signiﬁcant. The
existence of non-linearities in the transmission of monetary policy shocks suggests a misspeciﬁcation of
policy in aggregate, linear models. We interpret the existence of these asymmetric, history-dependent
results as suggestive of the importance of the credit channel, broadly construed.
In section 2 we discuss related research; our approach can be viewed as merging concepts from dif-
ferent literatures, notably on the regional effects of monetary policy and on asymmetric policy models,
with an emphasis on a lending or credit channel. Section 3 discusses how and why state dependence of
monetary policy might arise at the sub-national level, and motivates the search for differential effects of
expansionary versus contractionary policy. Section 4 incorporates these considerations into a statistical
model, and section 5 reports the empirical results from U.S. state-level data. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Recently, several authors have investigated whether the effects of monetary policy might differ across
U.S. regions or states. Because estimation with a state-level panel would quickly use up degrees of free-
dom, especially in a vector autoregressive (VAR) or simultaneous-equations framework, many authors
aggregate to a smaller number of regions. For example, Carlino and DeFina (1998) estimate a regional
VAR model for the eight Bureau of Economic Analysis regions.3 They ﬁnd that contractionary shocks to
the Federal Funds rate affect states in the Great Lakes region more, and states in the Rocky Mountain
3The BEA’s eight U.S. regions are: New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT), Mideast (DE, DC, MD, NJ, NY, PA), Southeast (AL,
AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV), Great Lakes (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI), Plains (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD), Rocky
Mountain (CO, ID, MT, UT, WY), Southwest (AZ, OK, NM, TX), and Far West (AK, CA, HI, OR, NV, WA).
2and Southwest regions less, than the remaining regions or the country as a whole. Their results are ro-
bust to common alternative monetary policy variables, and to using employment growth instead of real
personalincomegrowthastheactivitymeasure. Whilesuchaggregationmightbethoughttomasksome
important aspects of the local economic relationships or to confound others, Carlino and DeFina (1999)
ﬁnd similar results with separately estimated VARs for the lower 48 states.
More recently, Owyang and Wall (2004) report evidence of structural breaks in the regional impacts
of monetary policy by estimating a single large regional VAR speciﬁcation separately over pre-Volcker
(1960Q1 – 1978Q4 in their paper) and post-Volcker (1983Q1 – 2002Q4) sub-samples. Our model gener-
alizes this idea by investigating the state dependent nature of monetary policy conditional on the prior
distributionoflocalshocks,ratherthanonaﬁnitesetofdiscretechangesinthepropagationmechanism.
In a paper close in spirit to our own investigation, Frantantoni and Schuh (2003) investigate the ef-
fects of monetary policy through regional housing markets. They develop a “heterogenous agent VAR”
approach which allows them to estimate a two-stage model: ﬁrst the regional dynamics are estimated
taking the national variables as given, then the aggregated regional variables are incorporated into a VAR
estimation with national data. As the dynamics at the aggregate national stage are inﬂuenced by the
distribution and history of shocks in the regional stage, their approach embodies a particular kind of
state dependence for monetary policy. They use their estimates to simulate how the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism changes in the midst of a coastal housing boom versus a more homogeneous regional
distribution. Due to constraints on the scope of available data (they collect a balanced panel of 27 U.S.
metropolitan statistical areas observed quarterly from 1986Q3 to 1996Q2), they present their results as
suggestive of the potential consequences of ignoring regional heterogeneity and state dependence for
monetary policy.
Both Frantantoni and Schuh (2003) and Owyang and Wall (2004) ﬁnd that the average length of
monetary-induced downturns generally are much shorter at the regional level than are those estimated
with national data. They both posit that aggregation bias may cause national VARs to over-estimate the
actual duration of the response of the activity variable. Consistent with our approach, each pair of au-
thors hypothesizes that non-linearities in the relationship between the policy variable and local activity
measures might explain this apparent bias.
In addition, we allow the magnitude and duration of the responses of activity to a monetary shock to
differ between expansionary and contractionary actions. Our approach to modeling these asymmetric
3effects is related to earlier work by Cover (1992), in which innovations to the policy instrument are sep-
arated into positive and negative components that are entered jointly into the estimation. Alternative
approaches, such as threshold VAR models (see, e.g., Choi, 1999), place even greater demands on the
data and therefore are not practical for our panel of state observations.4 Details of the treatment of the
asymmetries in the model are presented in sections 4 and 5.
3 Policy Transmission at the Sub-National Level
Several of the papers cited previously establish signiﬁcant variation in business cycles across U.S. re-
gions. Asynchronous ﬂuctuations in real economic activity could be due to idiosyncratic shocks or to
common shocks with different propagation mechanisms. State-level differences in the industrial mix or
structureoftheﬁnancialsectorareoftencitedaspotentialsourcesofthisvariation, althoughdifferences
in local labor markets, natural resource endowments, expenditure and tax policies, regulatory environ-
ments, or other attributes could also be contributing factors. As we explain below, we suspect that the
banking sector plays an important role in the differential transmission of monetary policy among sub-
national areas as well.
Atthenationallevel,numerousauthorshavefoundevidencesupportingtheimportanceofthebank-
ing sector for the transmission of monetary policy; Bernanke and Gertler (1995) provide an overview.5
Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999) and Owyang and Wall (2004) use proxies for a traditional interest rate
channel of monetary policy as well as for various deﬁnitions of the credit channel to test which are
systematically related to the cross-regional (or state) differences in the response to monetary shocks.6
Their results are decided mixed. Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999) report only weak support for the broad
credit channel and none for the narrow credit channel in their sample. Owyang and Wall (2004), by
contrast, ﬁnd that the narrow credit channel can account for the depth of the income response to mone-
tary shocks, but not their cumulative cost (income loss), during their post-Volcker sample. For their full
sample, all three channel proxies have signiﬁcant explanatory power for the cumulative loss, but none
4Choi (1999) also focuses on distinct policy regimes, whereas we consider differential effects of policy actions.
5HansonMcPhersonandWaller(2000)provideevidencethatbanklendingismorealocalthannationalactivity, socomplete
smoothing across regions is not possible.
6For the interest rate channel, the fraction of employment in manufacturing is used as the proxy. For the broad credit chan-
nel — that small ﬁrms have more limited access to non-bank sources of funds — some measure of the concentration of ﬁrms
by size (usually employment) is used. For the narrow credit (or bank lending) channel — that smaller banks have difﬁculty
adjusting their balance sheets and thus constrain loans more during tight monetary policy, as in Kashyap and Stein (2000) — a
measure of bank deposit or loan shares is employed.
4for the depth of monetary-induced recessions. Reconciling these differences is difﬁcult, as the studies
investigate different sample periods, regional deﬁnitions, and policy experiments.
Frantantoni and Schuh (2003) examine mortgage interest rates as their link between aggregate ac-
tivity and regional heterogeneity, and ﬁnd evidence of state dependence in monetary transmission via
the housing market. Our approach is less direct, but arguably more general. Like Frantantoni and Schuh
(2003), we seek to determine how the monetary transmission mechanism changes over the business
cycle. While there are likely numerous possible interactions, we focus on the credit channel (broadly
construed) as a potential rationale for both asymmetric and state-dependent effects of monetary policy.
Changes in the value of collateral held by borrowers — or, equivalently, the asset side of banks’ balance
sheets — will affect the level of lending activity in a region.7 Such changes are likely to be highly corre-
lated with the rate of local economic activity; consider the value of residential real estate, for example.
From the lender’s perspective, the distribution of potential borrowers — or the expected return on in-
vestment projects — may also vary over the business cycle. If banks tend to ration the supply of loans
when such adverse selection or moral hazard problems are more prevalent, then areas growing more
slowly are more likely to suffer as a result. Our approach does not require us to separately identify loan
supply and demand shocks, which arguably represents an advantage.8
These effects describe the conditions existing in local markets prior to a change in monetary policy.
In this environment, contractionary monetary policy should disproportionally affect those localities al-
readygrowingmoreslowly. Ashasbeenemphasizedinthelendingchannelliterature(see,e.g.,Bernanke
and Gertler, 1995), contractionary monetary policy is likely to result in a reduction of lending activity
due to the asymmetric information or balance sheet issues raised above. For regions that are growing
relatively quickly, such effects are likely to be less drastic than for areas in which collateral values are
falling or banks are already nervous about lending. As a concrete example, contractionary policy might
be expected to depress activity even more in a relatively slow growth area such as the Midwest in the
mid-1980s, whereas the impact on the booming coasts might be proportionally smaller.
The same logic should hold for expansionary policy as well: for regions already growing relatively
quickly, a loosening of policy should result in a greater expansion of lending activity (many more con-
sumers who can beneﬁt from mortgage reﬁnancing, for example) relative to regions growing sluggishly
(or shrinking). Thus, for a region that is growing relatively quickly, the positive effects of expansionary
7Notice that this scenario has aspects of both the broad and narrow credit channels.
8For perspectives on the challenges of identifying changes in loan supply, see, e.g., Peek et al. (2003) and Driscoll (2004).
5monetary policy changes are ampliﬁed while the negative effects of contractionary changes are miti-
gated. The converse is true for regions that are growing more slowly (or contracting more quickly) than
average. As a result, the logic of the state-dependent nature of policy also suggests an important asym-
metry between expansionary and contractionary policy changes. Our goal in this paper is to quantify
theimpactofmonetarypolicychangesinthesefourpotentiallydifferentcases. Insection4weformalize
the above discussion into an econometric speciﬁcation, which is then estimated on a panel of U.S. state
data. Those results are discussed in section 5.
4 Empirical Model
Let yit represent observations on the endogenous measure of economic activity for state i in time pe-
riod t. Note that yit could be a vector, although in our estimates below we use a single series. Let zt be
a vector of national variables, including the monetary policy instrument. A general dynamic representa-












γjk (yit−j ·zt−k)+εi +µt +νit (1)
wherethecompositeerrortermincludesstateﬁxedeffects(εi), astochastictimetrend(µt), andidiosyn-
cratic state-level shocks (νit).
Notice that we have included the interaction of the lagged endogenous variable with the vector of
national variables. These terms allow for the possibility of state dependence in the effects of the aggre-
gate variables on the local activity measure. Based on our discussion above, we are most interested in
the γjk terms that measure the importance of the interaction with the monetary policy instrument in zt.
As written, equation (1) is likely to suffer from endogenous regressors. As in Frantantoni and Schuh
(2003), we could presume the national variables are predetermined with respect to the state-level dy-
namics. The dimensionality of our data set prohibits applying their HAVAR approach, in which an aggre-
gation equation transmits the cumulative effects of changes in the local endogenous variables back to
thenationallevel. Alternatively, likemuchoftheregionalVARliterature, wecouldassumethatmonetary
policy only affects activity variables with a lag, and replace k = 0 with k = 1 in the above speciﬁcation.
However, our interaction terms are not conducive to standard VAR estimation techniques, which pre-
sume a linear model.
6Therefore we take an alternative approach. As we are interested in the differential effects of policy
across geographical areas, we subtract the cross-sectional average of the endogenous activity variable
from each state observation at every point in time: e yit = yit − 1
N
PN
i=1 yit. This geographically de-meaned
variable captures the cross-state dispersion of the activity measures.









γjk (e yit−j ·zt−k)+e εi +e νit (2)
Notice that this transformation eliminates all terms that do not vary across location (namely zt and µt).
As these variables are the source of the potential endogeneity problem for equation (1), the transforma-
tion results in a speciﬁcation that can be estimated by OLS — provided the central bank does not set
policy in response to the dispersion of regional activity. Based on the discussion in section 2, we ﬁnd this
assumption both plausible and consistent with Federal Reserve behavior. Thus, while equation (2) still
includes the contemporaneous macroeconomic variables interacted with the vector of lagged endoge-
nous variables, OLS estimation will be consistent. Put another way, even if zt were correlated with νit, it
is unlikely to be correlated with e νit. Equation (2) is the basis for our empirical results in section 5. Notice
that, relative to the regional VAR models discussed in section 2, our approach can consistently estimate
the effects of contemporaneous policy innovations on the cross-sectional distribution of state economic
activity.9
4.1 Computation of Responses to Monetary Shocks
To estimate the dynamic effects of a monetary policy shock for the dispersion of real state activity, we
start by assuming that the local economy is in its steady-state. Then, in the absence of any changes to
monetarypolicy,state-speciﬁcshocks(e νit)leadtotemporarybusinesscycleeffectsasthestateeconomy
converges back to the steady state. These cycles are protracted, however, so that a state that experiences
an idiosyncratic shock can expect to remain away from trend for several quarters. In section 5 we shock
our model with a one standard deviation shock (positive or negative) one or more quarters prior to the
change in monetary policy to create a low growth (negative shock) or high growth (positive shock) local
9Insection5wegenerallycannotrejectthatnullhypothesisthattheinteractiontermsinvolvingthecontemporaneousfunds
rate are jointly zero, nor the null that they sum to zero. These results provide some support for the common practice in VAR
models of using the lagged response of activity variables to a monetary policy as an identifying assumption.
7environment, relative to the average state.10
So long as the central bank does not respond to regional dispersion in economic activity, as argued
above, conceptually we can employ a two-step procedure: we can recover the dynamics of an exogenous
monetary policy shock to the policy instrument from a model estimated with national data (such as a
VAR),thenfeedtheresponseoftheinstrumentintothemovingaveragerepresentationofthede-meaned
state activity variable to ﬁnd its dynamics.11
From the ﬁrst stage we can recover the policy instrument as a function of all the structural shocks
at the national level, including the monetary policy shock. For the purposes of measuring the impact of
monetary policy shocks, we normalize the other shocks to zero at all horizons. Then the policy variable










To ﬁnd the impact of a one-time shock to monetary policy on the cross-sectionally demeaned state
activity variable, e yit, we ﬁrst lead equation (2) by h periods (after normalizing the steady state and leads









γjk (e yit−j+h ·zt−k+h). (5)





θh−k for h ≥k
0 for h <k
(6)
10Recall that the monetary policy shock is orthogonal to the state idiosyncratic shock by construction.
11This technique accounts for national non-monetary factors in one of two ways: those that have no distributional conse-
quences are eliminated by geographically de-meaning the data as in equation (2); those that do are captured by the regional
shocks, e νit.













Collecting common terms for e yit+h yields a recursive formula for the impulse responses to a one-time
monetary policy shock (µt), given the previously estimated lag polynominal Θ(L) for the dynamics of the














· e yit+h−j (7)
Equation (7) forms the basis for the simulation of the impulse responses. With multiple observations
at the same point in time, one can hold constant the nature of the monetary impulse and monitor how
differentlocalitiesreactasafunctionoftheircurrenteconomicconditions. Conditionalonthisinforma-
tion, systematically different effects from similar shocks would provide evidence that monetary policy is
state dependent.
5 Results
5.1 Data Measurement and Transformations
Therawdataforthestateactivityvariableusedintheestimatesbelowispersonalincomeforall50states
since 1969Q1, as reported by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Because price indexes are not avail-
able for individual states, we convert these data into real 2000 dollars by the U.S. implicit price deﬂator
for GDP. We further divide by quarterly state population to produce per capita real income.12 Our mea-
sure of state economic activity, yit, is the annualized one-quarter growth rate of real per capita personal
income. Our preferred measure of the monetary policy instrument is the effective Federal Funds rate;
we use the ﬁnal month of each quarter as our quarterly observation. After accounting for lags and the
computation of the income growth rate, our base model is estimated over the period 1970Q2 – 2003Q4.
In total, our sample consists of a balanced panel of 6,550 observations.
12Annual state population estimates come from the U.S. Census Bureau. We linearly interpolate a quarterly series with the
third quarter observation set to the value reported by Census each July, save for the decadal observations of 1970, 1980 and
1990; these are reported in April and coded as the second quarter observation for those years.
9Figure 1 plots the cross-sectional average of the growth rate of real per capita personal income, along
with the corresponding one standard deviation interval (the grey shaded region) computed per quarter.
For our full sample, the annualized mean quarterly growth rate of real per capita income for the country
as a whole is 2.1% with an annualized standard deviation of 2.3%. However, some of the smaller states
(intermsofpopulation)exhibitfarmorevolatilequarterlygrowthrates. Forexample,theaverageannual
rate of income growth for South Dakota is 2.4% in our sample, while the standard deviation is 13%. By
contrast, California(thelargeststateby population)hasanaverageannualincomegrowthof2.1%witha
standard deviationof1.9%, closely mirroring the national ﬁgures. To avoid havingthe observations from
the smaller states unduly inﬂuence our results, we use a weighted estimation technique. The weights are
each state’s population as a proportion of the total national population in period t.13
5.2 Quantifying the State Dependence Effect
We begin by estimating equation (2) above. The geographically de-meaned activity measure, e yit, is the
one-quarter income growth rate in state i at date t less the average growth rate across all 50 states at
time t. We use p = 4 lags of demeaned income growth and q = 3 lags of the Funds rate (plus the con-
temporaneous observation) in our estimation. Notice that the monetary policy instrument only enters
equation (2) interacted with lagged observations of the dependent variable.
Ourmainhypothesisisthatstatesthataredoingrelativelyworsethanthenationalaveragewillhavea
larger negative response to a monetary contraction than the average state. In other words, a “depressed”
state will move farther away from the average following a negative monetary policy shock. For our spec-
iﬁcation, this hypothesis implies a positive sum of the γjk terms in equations (1) and (2).14 Collectively,
the b γjk sum to −0.01 (p-value = 0.39). However, the coefﬁcients on the more recent lags of the Fed Funds
rateinteractionsarelargerandhighlysigniﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, thesumof b γ10 through b γ51 is0.06(p-value
= 0.02) and the sum of b γ10 through b γ62 is 0.03 (p-value = 0.17). We conclude that increases in the Federal
Fundsrateduringthecontemporaneousorimmediatelypreviousquartercausestateswithrelativelylow
growth rates in the recent past to diverge even more from the national average.
13We also experimented with excluding the most volatile states from the sample entirely (usually Montana, North Dakota,
and South Dakota) and with an unbalanced panel formed by truncating the top and bottom 1% of the individual observations
ondemeanedstateincomegrowth. Inthemajorityofthesecasesthetruncationandexclusionmethodsmadeourresultsbelow
stronger and more statistically signiﬁcant. For exposition, we only report the results from the weighted regressions.
14Each interaction term is the product γjk × e yit−j ×zt−k. A contractionary Funds rate shock (positive zt−k) interacting with
a “depressed” state (negative e yit−j) yields a lower than average impulse response if γjk >0.
10As in the VAR literature, the large number of coefﬁcient estimates in equation (2) are difﬁcult to in-
terpret individually, or even jointly. To really uncover the dynamic effects of a monetary policy shock on
the distribution of state income growth in our model, we compute dynamic responses for e yit. Due to the
statedependencyrepresentedbytheinteractionterms,themagnitudeanddurationofthecomputedre-
sponsesdependsontheassumedinitiallaggedvaluesof e yit−j, whichinturnareafunctionofthehistory
of cross-sectionally demeaned idiosyncratic shocks, e νit−j.15
Therefore, we presume a state ﬁrst experiences a one-time exogenous shock to e νit−j. This devia-
tion from the steady-state can then give rise to non-trivial effects of a monetary policy change working
through the interaction terms. It is important to recognize that the time t−j idiosyncratic shock and the
time t monetary policy shock are independent; this framework merely permits a straight-forward way
to quantify the signiﬁcance of the state dependence terms. In the ﬁgures shown below, we let j = 4 and
e νit−j equal one standard deviation below the average state income growth rate in our sample.
To further isolate the quantitative signiﬁcance of the interaction terms, we can simulate the impulse
response to the e νit−j shock alone, without any subsequent monetary policy shock. This response is a
functionsolelyofthe b αj parameters, andprovidesthebaselinedynamicsforastate thatisshockedaway
from its steady-state growth rate (normalized to zero). These natural “business cycle” dynamics of the
endogenous activity variable will eventually return state i to its long-run average growth rate; in our
sample the initial shock is approximately 5 percentage points and the own response of e yit−j+h persists
for about h =12 quarters on average.16
What is the additional impact of a contractionary shock to monetary policy for a state that experi-
enced a negative idiosyncratic shock four quarters ago? To measure this effect, we compute the impulse
responses from a one-time 25 basis point increase in the Fed Funds rate and subtract the underlying
dynamics as speciﬁed in the previous paragraph. The resulting response is shown in ﬁgure 2. Note that
this response is not exactly the one given by equation (7), as it ignores the persistence of the Funds rate
(the θh terms for h ≥1). As it turns out, a one-time 25 basis point shock to the Fed Funds rate has nearly
the same quantitative effect as simulating a persistent response of the Funds rate to a exogenous mon-
etary policy shock, as represented by equation (3).17 Therefore, to simplify the exposition we focus our
15Noticethatifastatewith e yit−j =0forall j >0weretoexperienceamonetarypolicyshock,therewouldbenodistributional
consequences: the h-period ahead interaction terms all would still be zero.
16Figure 8 plots the impulse response of a one-standard deviation negative shock to e νit−4 over the subsequent 20 quarters.
17The b θh estimates are generated by a 6-variable structural VAR on U.S. macroeconomic data as in Christiano et al. (1999).
11discussion on the impulse responses from the one-time shock.
LikeCarlinoandDeFina(1998,1999),wereportthecumulativeresponsesofthestateactivityvariable
to a one-time monetary policy shock. Figure 2 shows the cumulative effect of the contractionary mon-
etary policy shock on the growth rate of a “depressed” state — one that experienced a negative shock to
e νit four quarters earlier. To reiterate, this response has been purged of the underlying natural dynamics
of the system and thus plots the incremental dynamic response due to the policy interaction terms only.
Theshadedregionrepresentsthebias-correctedbootstrapped90%conﬁdenceintervalfortheestimated
response.18
Recall that by virtue of the earlier negative shock to e νit+h, the “depressed” state in this experiment
will be growing more slowly than the average state. The one-time contractionary policy shock at h = 0
furtherslowsgrowthinthisstate,asshowninﬁgure2. Byh =8quartersaftertheinnovationtotheFunds
rate, most of the impact has been felt, and the cumulative additional reduction in the “depressed” state’s
growth rate is nearly −0.11 percentage points. This response is statistically discernible from zero at all
forecast horizons greater than zero.
Carlino and DeFina (1999) estimate state-by-state VARs and report an average cumulative reduc-
tion in state personal income growth from a 100-basis point contractionary shock to be 1.16 percentage
points at an 8-quarter forecast horizon.19 Scaling proportionally, our 25 basis point shock should imply
a 0.29 percentage point cumulative fall in state income growth after 8 quarters for a state at the mean
cross-sectional growth rate. For a state that was growing more slowly than average when the 25 basis
point shock occurred, output growth slowed an additional 0.11 percentage points, or 0.40 percentage
points overall. We interpret this additional state-dependent effect as sizable relative to the established
results in the literature.
Conversely, the speciﬁcation of our model implies that a state that starts out one standard deviation
above the mean growth rate four quarters prior to the contractionary policy shock experiences a positive
incremental response of 0.11 percentage points. Again taking the Carlino and DeFina (1999) estimates
as our baseline, such a state would still experience a reduction in its growth rate from the contractionary
policy shock, but the net cumulative effect would be only a 0.29−0.11 = 0.18 percentage point decline.
18Our bootstrap program re-estimates equation (2) 1000 times by re-sampling our original data with replacement. After the
regressionisestimated,were-computetheincrementaleffectofa25basispointincreaseintheFederalFundsrateasdescribed
above.
19Conceptually, they embedded our equation (1) in a VAR framework and estimate under the assumption that all γjk are
identically zero. Their sample period is 1958Q1 – 1992Q4.
12Notice that the 0.22 percentage point disparity between states with “high” and “low” initial conditions
relative to the average is comparable in magnitude to the estimated average response itself.
In summary, monetary contractions lead to larger declines in income growth for states experiencing
relatively worse economic growth in the recent past as compared with the average state. By contrast,
states experiencing relatively better economic growth in the recent past have smaller declines in income
growth as compared with the average state.
5.3 Asymmetric Policy Effects
Equation (2), like most linear dynamic models (including VARs), also is symmetric in the policy shock:
the model speciﬁcation implies that a 25 basis point expansionary policy shock should result in an iden-
tical impulse response, opposite in sign, to that shown in ﬁgure 2. Yet as explored in sections 2 and 3,
both theory and some related evidence support the proposition that contractionary policy might have
different effects than expansionary policy for a state away from the cross-sectional average. To test this
conjecture, we divide the policy innovations into positive and negative changes in the Funds rate, and


















jk (e yit−j ·z−
t−k)+e εi +e νit (8)
where z+
t−k and z−
t−k are the contractionary and expansionary changes to monetary policy, respectively,
and γ+
jk and γ−
jk are the corresponding coefﬁcients on the interaction terms to be estimated.20
The sum of the estimated coefﬁcients on the interaction terms for contractionary policy shocks (i.e.
increases in the Fed Funds rate) is similar to the above results:
PP
j,k b γ+
jk = 0.04 (p-value of 0.16). How-
ever, for the expansionary shocks (i.e. decreases in the Fed Funds rate) the sum of the estimated coef-
ﬁcients on the interaction terms is
PP
j,k b γ−
jk = −0.05 (p-value = 0.02). The sign of these accumulated
coefﬁcients conﬁrms our intuition about the nature of the effect: an expansionary shock (∆zt < 0) for a
relatively slow-growing state (e yit < 0) still results in a fall in income growth relative to the average state.
Moreover, the magnitude is larger than the estimated effect for negative shocks or the overall effect re-
ported for the previous symmetric model, and is strongly statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, these
20Cover (1992) uses a similar econometric approach.
13results contradict the old saw that “monetary policy cannot push on a string” — at least when it comes
to the impact on the regional distribution of economic activity.21
Weconductadditionalpolicyexperimentsforourhypothetically“depressed”state,deﬁnedasabove,
to compute separate dynamic responses for contractionary and expansionary policy shocks, respec-
tively. Figure 3 shows the cumulative effect on the “depressed” state’s growth in per capita income in
response to a 25 basis points increase in the Fed Funds rate, along with the bootstrapped bias-corrected
90% conﬁdence region. Figure 4 plots the cumulative response for the “depressed” state following a Fed
Funds decrease of 25 basis points. The ﬁgures look very similar, yet have the striking interpretation that
expansionary shocks are not the mirror image of contractionary shocks — in fact, the economic per-
formance of relatively “depressed” states worsens in response to both expansionary and contractionary
shocks! Put another way, compared to the average state, states initially in a “low” position (i.e. recently
haveexperiencednegativeidiosyncraticshocks)experiencelargereconomiccontractionsinresponseto
Federal Fund rate increases and smaller economic expansions in response to Fund rate declines. Like-
wise, states that start in a “high” position (i.e. recently have experienced negative idiosyncratic shocks)
experience larger economic expansions in response to rate declines and smaller economic contractions
in response to rate increases.
5.4 Robustness: Sample Period
Owyang and Wall (2004) document much smaller effects of monetary policy on US regions following the
Volckerdisinﬂation.22 Estimationofequation(2)forthepost-Volkersample,1984Q1–2003Q4,generates
similar impulse responses as in the full sample (1970Q2 – 2003Q4). Figure 5 is analogous to ﬁgure 2, cor-
responding to the model with state dependency but symmetric policy effects. Figures 6 and 7 show the
estimates from our asymmetric model estimated over the post-Volcker sub-sample. States performing
below average still experience greater output declines in response to monetary contractions and smaller
outputgainsinresponsetomonetaryexpansions. Thecumulativeeffectsestimatedwiththepost-Volker
sample are larger than those estimated over the full sample. However, given the conﬁdence bands, we
cannot reject the null that the estimated magnitudes across the two samples are the same. These results
imply that the relative importance of the distributional effects of monetary policy studied herein has
21We conjecture that the consumer credit channel, particularly mortgage reﬁnancing, plays an important role in the trans-
mission of expansionary monetary policy at this level of disaggregation.
22Hanson (2004) reports similar results in VARs estimated with aggregate U.S. data.
14increased over time as the mean response to policy shocks has fallen.
These sub-sample results may seem surprising in light of changes in U.S. interstate banking regula-
tionssincethemid-1908s, whichlikelyreducedtherelianceonlocalcreditproviders. Ourresultssuggest
the possibility that any dampening of the regional variation in loan supply that may have followed from
these changes in the structure of the banking sector are less important than regional contributions to
ﬂuctuations in loan demand. Most collateral, such as houses or physical plant and equipment, cannot
be easily relocated in the face of regional shocks. The rise of home equity loans and mortgage reﬁnanc-
ing in the latter part of our sample may have signiﬁcantly increased the importance of this particular
channel. Based on our results, this issue deserves further empirical investigation.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we establish a new set of stylized facts about the effects of monetary policy at the state
level in the U.S. Unlike other research on the regional effects of monetary policy, our approach focuses
on how policy affects the distribution of real economic activity in the cross-section of U.S. states over
time. State business cycles are not synchronized: at any given point in time, some states are growing
much faster and some much slower than the average. The Federal Reserve, however, conducts monetary
policy to stabilize the national business cycle. In this paper we investigate whether this environment
leadsacommonchangeinFedpolicytohavedifferentialeffectsacrossstates, conditionalontheirinitial
business cycle position.
Our results are both sizable and striking. In our estimates, monetary contractions lead to larger de-
clines in economic activity for states experiencing relatively worse economic growth in the recent past,
ascomparedtotheaveragestate. Otherauthorshaveestimatedtheaveragestate-leveleffectofthesame
contractionarypolicyexperimenttobearounda0.29percentagepointcumulativereductioninrealstate
income growth. Taking that value as a baseline, our results imply that a 25 basis point increase in the Fed
Funds rate widens the dispersion in state income growth by 22 basis points. This distributional effect is
on the same order of magnitude as the estimated mean effects in previously published research.
Wealsoprovideevidenceagainstsymmetryintheimpactsofexpansionaryandcontractionarymon-
etary policy in our speciﬁcation. Relatively low-growth states experience smaller increases in economic
activity in response to a monetary expansion than does the average state. Collectively, we conclude that
15monetary policy has large distributional implications across regions of the United States. Our results
suggest that monetary policy does, in fact, help least those areas that need it the most, in that their local
economic conditions already were worse relative to a national average when the policy was enacted. Put
another way, while expansionary monetary policy may lead to an overall increase in aggregate output,
the majority of that increase will occur in the parts of the country that were already performing better
than average. There will be much less stimulus in those parts of the country that had been performing
relatively worse than average.
Our approach is distinct from existing research that estimates the effect of monetary policy to vary
systematicallyacrossstates—say,tohaveagreatereffectinMichiganthaninArizona. Whileothershave
posited that banking structure and industrial mix determine a given state’s responsiveness to monetary
policy, we investigate the interaction between the recent business conditions in a state and changes in
monetary policy after controlling for these state ﬁxed effects. Speaking loosely, our research addresses
the differential effects of monetary policy when a state — be it Michigan or Arizona — is booming (rela-
tivetothenationalaverage)incomparisonwiththeeffectswhenthatsamestateisinaslowdown(again,
relative to average).
This research has several broader implications as well. First, our results suggest an important role
for history-dependence and asymmetries in the impact of monetary policy. State-level data provide a
natural environment to investigate such components, which commonly are absent from estimates with
nationaldata—aswellasexistingregionalresearch. Second,thesedistributionaleffectslikelygeneralize
to other locations. One speciﬁc case is the European Monetary Union: as with the U.S. states, members
of EMU face a common monetary policy implemented at the aggregate Euro-zone level. As the cross-
country disparities in growth among the EMU member countries appear to be larger on average than
those for the U.S. states, the effects identiﬁed by our research are likely to be even stronger within the
Euroarea. Finally,whileourworkinthisareaisstillpreliminary,webelieveourresultsprovideadditional
evidence for the importance of the credit channel, broadly deﬁned, in the transmission of monetary
policy. We intend to explore this issue further in subsequent research.
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